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ANSWERING ANOTHER ‘IRISH QUESTION’: BREXIT AND THE IRISH BORDER 
 
Gladstone .. spent his declining years trying to guess the answer to the Irish Question; unfortunately, 
whenever he was getting warm, the Irish secretly changed the Question  
  
      W.C. Sellar and R. J. Yeatman 1066 and All That: A Memorable History of England (1930) 
 
  
PART TWO. BREXIT’S UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: FIVE KEY CHALLENGES 
 
I have been struck, in my reading, by the presence of chaos and confusion at every level of human affairs. 
As we see today, the public world seems to veer from catastrophe to crisis without any perceptible pattern 
or explanation. It has always been so and there is a case for saying that human history, as it is generally 
described and understood, is the sum total of accident and unintended consequence. Peter Ackroyd  (2011) 
 
 
THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF THE BELFAST AGREEMENT 
The Irish peace process ratified in 1998 was more a matter of contingency than design, a 
rather fortuitous alignment of circumstances that persuaded parties to an ancient quarrel to 
address their differences. What these parties signed up to was two principal commitments: a 
multi-party Agreement between the principal protagonists in Northern Ireland and a flanking 
Anglo-Irish Agreement between the two governments. A legally binding international treaty 
between United Kingdom and Irish governments was duly lodged with the United Nations, its 
co-signatories undertaking (Article 2) to support and ‘‘where appropriate implement the 
provisions of the Multi-Party Agreement’’. The signatories likewise committed to closer co-
operation between the United Kingdom and Ireland as ‘‘partners in the European Union’’, 
and identified common issues as prospective subjects for discussion and further negotiation in 
the British-Irish Council, created as the medium for intergovernmental deliberations. These 
arrangements both confirmed and facilitated mutually reinforcing communal and 
international commitments, above all framed within the context of mutual EU membership of 
all parties, whether as citizens or governments.  
The EU framework that facilitated and legitimized the peace process mirrored both the 
aspirations and experience of closer integration elsewhere in the Continent, with reciprocal 
political relations and functional co-operation on every level. The primary parties to the peace 
process were the governments in London and Dublin, but with both the EU and Washington 
acting as international guarantors, essential diplomatic interlocutors between the Northern 
Ireland parties and communities on both sides of the border.1 The 1921 border symbolized a 
cultural fault line as much as a political border, and one until recently manifested by barbed 
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Union and the Belfast Agreement’, Review of International Studies, 26 (1) 2000, pp. 83-97. 
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wire, military fortifications and manned presence. EC / EU accession by both governments in 
1973 reduced the border’s formal significance, with increasing transit of goods services and 
people in both direction, as well as greater cross-border collaboration on a range of social, 
economic and infrastructural projects. The peace process after 1998 exponentially increased 
functional co-operation, much of it generously financed by EC / EU structural funding.2  
On the political plane power sharing, although acknowledging mutual claims for cultural 
recognition, did commit belligerent communities to reconcile their differences by ensuring 
equivalence in accessing public power and resources. When the Belfast Agreement was 
signed there was no question that both the United Kingdom and the Republic would not 
continue as EU Member States in perpetuity, although the agreement does not explicitly refer 
to their EU status as such. Accordingly, the Belfast Agreement does not preclude either 
government withdrawing from the European Union.3 The Brexit vote has ended any such 
complacency about ineluctable co-operation: indeed, it raises fresh doubts about the state of 
Anglo-Irish relations, and not least the status of the post-Brexit Irish border.  
The Belfast Agreement underlined commitment to reconciliation, a landmark for ending an 
ancient quarrel, and in the process making the physical border both invisible and politically 
redundant. Or so it seemed until the Brexit vote. Brexit has raised many challenges for future 
EU / United Kingdom relations, though none of greater significance than the indeterminate 
status of the Irish border, reviving anxieties all round about renewed threat to what is still a 
fragile peace in this querulous region. This accord was always about more than domestic 
politics, inasmuch as commitment to shared European values was integral to both its 
procedures and delivery. Signatories are required to take account of common interests and in 
every aspect of the agreement.4 The new institutional arrangements likewise acknowledge 
cross-border and EU-related dimensions of the peace process. A British-Irish Council has the 
formal task of reviewing all EU-related matters in otherwise bi-lateral relations, and an all-
Ireland North-South Ministerial Council that includes members from the governments of the 
Republic and Northern Ireland is mandated with improving intergovernmental co-operation.  
The EU’s framework programmes for improving governance and political relations, cross-
border co-operation and disbursing structural funds to these ends, have likewise contributed 
much to this remarkable transformation.5 Moreover, this agency both facilitated and 
intensified co-operation across a range of activities: commercial / economic development, 
capital flows, business and enterprise, agriculture, tourism, and not least social inclusion and 
civic engagement.6 The EU’s ‘four freedoms’ (movement of goods, services and money) 
                                                          
2 John Doyle, Governance and Citizenship in contested states: the Northern Ireland peace agreement as internationalised 
governance, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 10 1999, pp.201-219. 
3 A case heard in October 2016 in the Belfast High Court case ruled that there was nothing in the Good Friday Agreement to 
prevent the triggering of Article 50. In its ruling, the High Court declared that EU membership was no constitutional 
requirement of the Good Friday Agreement which would be breached by notification of Article 50. See R (Miller) and others 
versus the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, 29 October 2016, The UK Supreme Court upheld the Belfast 
High Court position in its ruling in January 2017, maintaining that the principle of consent for constitutional change 
contained in the Good Friday Agreement referred only to whether Northern Ireland remained in the UK or was unified with 
the rest of Ireland. 
4 British-Irish Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of Ireland, Belfast, 10 April 1998, at para 1. 
5 B.  Laffan, The EU context of change in state and nation post- 1973’, in N. Ó Dochartaigh, K. Hayward and E. Meehan 
(eds) Dynamics of Political Change in Ireland: Making and breaking a divided Ireland (Routledge, London, 2017), pp.44-
60. 
6 J. Bradley and D. Hamilton Bradley, Making Policy in Northern Ireland: A critique of Strategy 2010, Administration, 47 
(3), 1999 pp.32-50. (1999). 
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markedly increased with the onset of the Single Market, connecting communities across a 
porous border.7 Moreover, free movement of persons as required by the rules of the Single 
Market has enhanced the sense of shared purpose, conferring additional citizens’ rights in a 
common space defined not merely by market making, but also by facilitating closer formal 
and informal networking in civil society. 
The principal EU agencies for facilitating these cross-border co-operation arrangements are 
the Support programme for Peace and reconciliation (SPPR), INTERREG, and Leader II 
programmes. Of particular importance for North-South collaboration is the Special European 
Union Programmes Body (SEUPB) that expedites and monitors the EU Programme for Peace 
and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland.8 To date, these programmes have disbursed some 2.3 
billion euros, making a significant contribution to improved trans-border relations and at 
every level, from community to intergovernmental co-operation.9 The scale of this fiscal 
support has been crucial for exponential progress. The border region is in receipt of some 3.5 
billion euros under the current 2014-20 Multiannual Financial Framework, and 
notwithstanding considerable additional subsidies and structural payments from the CAP. 
Overall, fully 8 percent of Northern Ireland’s GDP derives directly from EU funds.10  
 
THE PEACE DIVIDEND: CROSS-BORDER TRADE AND FUNCTIONAL CO-OPERATION 
The border situation prior to the Belfast agreement was a tolerated rather than a fully settled 
arrangement. A confluence of competing and multi-level claims, uneasy synergy between 
domestic (Northern Ireland) regional (cross-border / North-South) and international 
(UK/Ireland) politics, as much contemporary politics is in an increasingly interdependent 
world. A once contested border and symptomatic of culturally embedded, almost tribal 
identities. The locus for ritualistic stand-offs and on occasion actual crisis, yet after 1998 
more politically de-fused than at any time since partition.11 At the outset a contested border 
but where over time improved relations and intergovernmental co-operation markedly 
increased, and most especially after 1973 with Anglo-Irish accession to the EEC. Thereafter, 
a border seen on either side as much less barrier than bridge, the conduit for increasing 
commercial and civic exchanges. Moreover, in the years following the Belfast Agreement, a 
border stripped of physical impediments, not least signage displaying national allegiance or 
symbols of exclusive sovereignty. A shared space rather than the ‘no man’s land’ of former 
times known disparagingly as ‘bandit country’, but now facilitating closer political 
engagement and economic co-operation at every level.12   
                                                          
7 See the comparisons cited by in E Tannam, The European Union and Business Cross-Border Co-Operation: the case of 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland’, Irish Political Studies, 11 1996, pp.103- 129  and idem Cross-Border Co-
operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland: Neo-Functionalism Revisited’, British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations, 6 (2) 2006 , 256–276.  
8 E. Meehan, Europe and the Europeanisation of the Irish Question 1972-1998, in M. Cox, A. Guelke and F. Stephens (eds) 
A Farewell to Arms? From ‘Long War’ to Long Peace in Northern Ireland (Manchester University Press, 2000). 
9 C. Irvin and S. Byrne, Economic Aid and its role in the Peace Process, in J. Neuheiser and S. Wolff (eds) Peace at Last? 
The Impact of the Good Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland (Berghann, London 2002). 
10 Brexit: UK-Irish relations, European Union Committee, 6th Report of session 2016-17, House of Lords 12 December 
2016, at p.46. 
11 E. Meehan, Britain’s Irish Question: Britain’s European Question?: British-Irish relations in the context of the European 
Union and the Belfast Agreement, Review of International Studies, 26 (1) 2000, pp. 83-97. 
12  A. Guelke, International dimensions of the Belfast Agreement, in R. Wilford (ed.) Aspects of the Belfast Agreement 
(Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 245-263.   
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The assumption made by governments in London and Dublin, and by most of the parties in 
Belfast, was that both governments and implicitly the EU too were principal guarantors of an 
irreversible peace.13 Anglo-Irish membership of the EU markedly improved mutual trade in 
goods and the EU was active in developing and financing extensive programmes for social 
and economic development on both sides of the border.14 Efforts principally channelled, as 
many EU initiatives are on projects for closer trans-border integration. Success here is plain 
to see in metrics measuring enhanced co-operation: in commercial / economic development, 
expanding business and enterprise, and similarly in agriculture, tourism, social inclusion and 
civic engagement.15 The very fact and quotidian experience of economic integration between 
formerly separated communities, agencies and governance saw exponentially increasing 
collaboration at every level.16 The EU’s free movement of goods, services, people and money 
markedly increased as consequence of the Single Market, as did enhanced connectivity in the 
political functional and communal domains.17 For example, free movement of persons 
required by the rules of the Single Market was augmented by common EU citizenship and 
incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, conferring additional welfare 
entitlement, legal and political rights within a shared political space.   
The success of these initiatives is nowhere better illustrated than in the matter of monetary 
union. The extent to which, and notwithstanding Ireland’s membership of the Eurozone and 
Northern Ireland’s retention of sterling, the border region has become a common business 
space, with both currencies accepted for transactions at every level. Co-operation not merely 
confined to economic matters, but with police and other agencies authorities on either side of 
an increasingly invisible border committed to maintaining security in what was formerly a 
contested cultural space, a conflict, and on occasions a war zone.18 
 
BREXIT RISKS THE PEACE PROCESS: FIVE KEY CHALLENGES 
Brexit has called into question the remarkable progress made in returning cross border 
relations and communal politics in Northern Ireland to something approximating civic 
normality’.19 Apprehension distilled as perceptible unease over the future status of the border 
on both sides. Anxiety here is only partly over technical or legalistic matters, for example 
border management as this relates to customs rules, tariffs or transit procedures. There is 
uncertainty too about the potential political outage, anticipated disruption from reinstating 
any degree of border formalities, not least political signage and national symbolism that 
might play to sectarian instincts, increasing the prospects of return of political violence.  
                                                          
13 Marie Smyth,Putting the Past in Its Place: Issues of Victimhood and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland’s Peace Process, in 
Nigel Biggar (ed), Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict (Georgetown University Press, 
Washington DC 2003), pp. 125-53. 
14 B.  Laffan in N. Ó Dochartaigh et al, op cit (2017) 
15 J. Bradley and D. Hamilton Bradley, Making Policy in Northern Ireland: A critique of Strategy 2010, Administration, 47 
(3), 1999 pp.32-50. (1999). 
16 J. Goodman, Single Europe, Single Ireland? Uneven development in process. Dublin (Irish Academic Press, 2000). 
17 See the comparisons cited by in E Tannam, The European Union and Business Cross-Border Co-Operation: the case of 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, Irish Political Studies, 11 1996, pp.103- 129  and ibid Cross-Border Co-
operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland: Neo-Functionalism Revisited’, British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations, 6 (2) 2006 , 256–276.  
18 P. Teague, The EU and the Irish Peace Process’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34 (4) 1996,pp. 549-70. 
19 Duncan Morrow, The Rise (and Fall?) of Reconciliation in Northern Ireland, The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict 
Studies 44 (1) (2012), pp. 5-35. 
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What are the likely consequences of Brexit for undermining political stability in these 
troubled lands? More important still, what are the most appropriate means for avoidance of a 
formal or ‘hard’ border between Ireland north and south that will mitigate this latent threat? 
What was already a mostly nominal border after 1973 and since the Belfast Agreement an 
increasingly meaningless one, has regained some of its former political edginess and cultural 
salience. Not merely as a source of friction between the EU and London, as witnessed in the 
Brexit negotiations, but also and depending on what kind of Brexit eventually emerges, as 
potent symbol of embedded cultural and politically charged differences over identity mostly 
dormant since 1998, set aside if not yet forgotten nor forgiven by everyone other than 
sectarian zealots.20  
Brexit’s has revived the prospect of a formal EU / UK border and not only in Ireland. Indeed, 
these are conjoined issues. Nevertheless, reinstatement of a hard border in Ireland brings its 
own special problems, threatens to revive the exclusivist communalism abated by the Belfast 
Agreement. It is hardly coincidence, that soon after the referendum, the power-sharing 
arrangement between the respective communities in the North stalled, followed by the 
longest period without a power-sharing executive at Stormont since 1998. Significant too is 
the fact that this particular fall-out is indicative of so far irreconcilable cultural differences 
that relate to communal identity, translated in this instance as an impasse over the official 
status of the Irish language.21  
There is broad agreement on all sides, in the Province, the United Kingdom and in EU 
counsels that Brexit raises broader issues, not least the capacity for new governance 
arrangements appropriate for what radical voices in this debate recommend as post-national 
politics. These are matters of concern, not only for future relations in Ireland but also for the 
United Kingdom’s future constitutional design. Challenges easily identified and a 
consequence of Brexit, but for which there are no easy solutions. These challenges translate 
as five critical questions facing the parties to the current negotiations. Distinct challenges, 
although each one a consequence of the historic acceptance of parity of esteem in public 
administration, legal practice and governance that requires equal status and civil rights for 
every citizen. No less important, is the threat to settled communal and constructive Anglo-
Irish relations. All of these issues supposedly resolved by the peace process, but now 
imperiled by the political fallout from Brexit. 
The first post-Brexit challenge is insidious threat to peace and political stability in Northern 
Ireland. What is at stake here is the future state of inter-communal relations, supposedly 
resolved in 1998 by ensuring cultural equality and civil rights. The second challenge relates 
to the practicalities of border management: how best to navigate these functional matters, 
managing cross-border transactions (notably, passage of goods, services and persons) that are 
unavoidable outcomes of a reinstated ‘hard’ border, and confirming soon-to-be separate 
international jurisdictions. A third and related challenge is how to avoid disruption to cross 
border regimes: the widely anticipated economic dislocation and not merely in Ireland, but 
also to the United Kingdom and European economies from the likely reinstatement of a 
                                                          
20 Duncan Morrow, The Rise (and Fall?) of Reconciliation in Northern Ireland, The Canadian Journal of Peace 
and Conflict Studies 44 (1) (2012):, pp. 5-35. 
21 J. Doyle and E. Connolly, Brexit and the Future of Northern Ireland , Dublin City University Brexit Research 
and Policy Unit  (2017).available online at http://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/WP-2017-1-
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‘hard’ border regime. Arrangements that will impair transit of trade, services and people, 
hinder business and other functional co-operation and constrain the flow of social capital 
between citizens and communities on the ground. A fourth challenge relates to avoidance of 
ancillary damage to free movement of people across a formalised or ‘hard’ border. Finally, 
and by no means the least of these cognate issues is the challenge of Brexit for civil rights 
and the potential impact of a reinstated border on identity politics. In effect, the elusive 
search for border arrangements that will ensure continuous and constructive inter-communal 
relations, and thereby guarantee the positive social, political and cultural legacies of the peace 
process. 
 
(1)Political stability and inter-communal relations: Brexit has no immediate consequences for 
the status or functioning of Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions. However, the fact 
that it might revive political tensions will have major and negative implications for the peace 
process. Uncertainty is no friend of stability and anxiety about the legal status of the border, 
rising unease about future relations between governments in London and Dublin, the political 
authorities in Stormont and Dublin and local governments on both sides of the border, 
threatens return to febrile politics supposedly set aside in 1998.  
Reinstating a border freighted with the usual symbolism of statehood, whether political 
insignia or documentation checks, may well reignite old resentments, attracting malign 
attention from extremist paramilitaries marginalized by the peace process.22 All of this in 
addition to purely functional concerns that will accompany a reinstated border, and most 
notably: reintroduction of customs checks, policing new financial rules and collecting 
customs dues, monitoring differential cross-border tax rates, tariffs, regulations and products 
standards in every commercial sector from manufactured goods to agri-food products. Not 
the least of these concerns is potential disruption to complex transnational supply chains, an 
increasing facet of modern production and globalised markets. All of these are pressing 
matters for Anglo-Irish relations and for both Northern communities, as they are too for 
ongoing negotiations between London and Brussels over Britain’s withdrawal terms.  
On the British side, there is rather more wishful thinking than clear-sighted realism about 
these matters. The official letter from the Prime Minister to the European Council formally 
triggering Article 50, acknowledged the ‘‘important responsibility to make sure that nothing 
is done to jeopardise the peace process in Northern Ireland, and (the commitment) to continue 
to uphold the Belfast Agreement’’. The official government position paper on Northern 
Ireland and Ireland, likewise confirmed the Belfast Agreement as ‘‘the bedrock of the peace 
process’’, affirming and that ‘‘nothing agreed as part of the United Kingdom’s exit in any 
way undermines the Agreement’’.23 Noble intentions, but followed by diplomacy that 
focused primarily on Britain’s preoccupation with securing favourable trade terms post-
                                                          
22 Brian Walker, The Irish government is pursuing Northern Ireland’s interests more actively than the UK government, The 
Constitution Unit, UCL May 23 2017 available online at https://constitution-unit.com/2017/05/23/the-irish-government-is-
pursuing-northern-irelands-interests-more-actively-than-the-uk government/. 
23 Northern Ireland and Ireland. Position Paper, HMG 16 August 2017,pp. 1-6. 
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Brexit, with the border issue almost an afterthought and relegated some way down London’s 
list of priorities.24  
The EU negotiators too have prioritised their own interests, principally to secure Britain’s 
financial obligations under the EU 2014-20 Multiannual Financial Framework and ensuring 
continuing rights for EU citizens’ resident in the United Kingdom. Only latterly has the 
border issue become a priority in its own right, once these other issues were resolved, and 
more significantly for both sides only after preliminary negotiations about likely prospects for 
future British trade relations trade became inextricably linked to the Irish border issue. Of the 
principal European institutions, the European Parliament has devoted greater attention to the 
border question, preoccupied as representative assemblies usually are with the ramifications 
of high-level politics and policy on the wider public.  
Elected members from border communities on both sides have worked assiduously in 
Strasbourg / Brussels, lobbied hard to ensure the achievements of the peace process are not 
lost to political expediency. In a resolution of 3rd October 2017, for example, the Parliament 
affirmed: ‘‘the unique position and special circumstances confronting the island of Ireland 
must be addressed in the withdrawal agreement and this in a manner fully consistent with the 
Good Friday Agreement in all its parts…. in order to ensure the continuity and stability of the 
Northern Ireland peace process.’’25 The Parliament’s insistence on assurances over the border 
have just about paid off, raising these concerns up the EU’s agenda, such that workable 
British proposals for managing the border are now seen on the EU side at least as the likely 
deal-breaker of any withdrawal agreement.  
 
(2) Practicalities of border management: The ‘problem’ of managing cross-border traffic, 
whether of goods or people, was widely anticipated, not least by those hostile to Brexit 
during the 2016 referendum campaign. So far, it has not been by no means the dominant issue 
in the withdrawal negotiations, except for those who live, work or do business in Ireland. The 
present Prime Minister Theresa May (speaking in her then capacity as Home Secretary) 
cautioned that, should the United Kingdom vote to leave the EU and with it arrangements for 
free movement, maintaining ‘‘an open border with a country (Ireland) that was in the EU and 
had access to free movement’’ would be to say the least problematic.26 So it has proved, 
although at the time she issued this prescient warning it went mostly unheeded by voters on 
the mainland. Brexit will certainly disrupt present arrangements at this border (as will at 
every point on the EU / UK border), on the functional as much as the political levels. 
Reversion to separate economic orders and legal jurisdictions in Ireland will require 
reinstatement of formal procedures at the border in conformity with WTO rules. This in turn 
will incur not merely economic inconvenience and impose additional business costs, but the 
return of statist signage that symbolizes national domains (policed crossing points and 
uniformed customs posts) will almost certainly attract malign attention from rogue 
                                                          
24 Prime Minister’s letter to Donald Tusk triggering Article 50, London, 29 March 2017, available online at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministersletter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-50.  
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insurgents, as it did in these borderlands in earlier times when mayhem and political violence 
was ‘normal’ politics.  
The critical issue here is how ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ a border will result from current negotiations. A 
febrile debate is underway between respective stakeholders that threatens to overshadow 
more mundane, if no less important matters such as finding agreement on appropriate trade 
and tariffs arrangements. In an increasingly interdependent and globalizing economy, 
production is transnational as much as merely local or national activity. Products at various 
stages of manufacture transit between EU Member States, and sometimes more than once in 
what are complex production processes and elaborate supply chains. The Single European 
Market has both facilitated and accelerated frictionless trade across internal EU borders. 
Britain’s exit from the SEM and the customs union will severely curtail these arrangements. 
A principal issue for both sides in the current negotiations is how to meet the challenge of 
maintaining the economic benefits of open borders and exponential economic 
interdependence for business, consumers and workers. Rapid transit of goods services and the 
passage of people is presently facilitated by Single Market and Customs Union arrangements. 
The United Kingdom’s exit from this open borders regime is certain to cause delays, 
introducing time-consuming administrative checks and with adverse economic consequences, 
disrupting commerce, adding to business costs and so on.  
No less important for Irish stakeholders is how to reduce the detrimental consequences for 
what is still a brittle peace of reversing, or at best impeding functional integration that is the 
essential ballast of stable inter-community politics on the ground. Formal border 
arrangements will re-politicize the border, as much as hindering transit of goods and people, 
impeding commerce and disrupting supply chains, ratcheting business costs, and inhibiting 
free movement of people in either direction. The latter an especially disruptive consequence, 
given that many thousands of citizens live in one part of Ireland yet work, study, access 
health care or other public goods, and do business in the other. Another negative externality 
of a hard border will be disruption to public procurement contracts, the sharing of resources 
and co-operation between trans-border agencies in the public sector, notably in health service 
provision and education.  
The most controversial proposal so far for addressing these issues is to relocate the border in 
the middle of the Irish Sea. Altogether less dramatic are various proposals to relocate customs 
and other procedural checks away from historic crossing points, for instance by establishing 
customs’ clearing stations away from politically sensitive crossing points. A raft of so-called 
median or hybrid solutions, each of them competing preferences for post-Brexit relations at 
the Irish border, are circulating between the parties to present negotiations, and they feature 
in the accompanying political discourse that frames the debate on this contentious question. 
These various proposals, their respective merits and shortcomings are discussed and in more 
detail in the third paper in this series.27 
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The issue to be considered here is how feasible is it, the encumbrances of history 
notwithstanding, to relocate the Irish border if only for administrative convenience? 
Wherever ‘border’ checks take place will not avoid or significantly reduce delay or disruption 
to presently smooth and mostly uncomplicated transit across what is likely to become a more 
formal frontier demarcating quite separate political realms and legal jurisdictions. Any such 
formalities will add to administrative clutter, require considerable investment by the 
appropriate customs and revenue authorities on either side and certainly disrupt the smooth 
flow of business, with the collateral consequence of increasing smuggling and other illicit 
cross-border activity. The prospective threat to current ease of transit across what is for the 
time being at least a mostly notional border does present real challenges to British 
negotiators, whose determination to recover control of the national border unites unionists in 
Northern Ireland and Tory ideologues at Westminster alike. Moreover, it precludes any 
‘solution’ to the border issue likely to be acceptable to the EU, Irish nationalists, and most 
especially to the Irish government. For EU27 on the other hand, the principal driver of their 
response to these issues is entirely opposite to the British Government’s: to resist any 
demand, avoid any concession to the departing United Kingdom that compromises the 
singularity of the Customs Union and Single Market, and that in the process might unravel a 
hard-won peace.   
 
 (3) Disruption of cross border regimes: EU and bilateral intergovernmental programmes alike 
have improved cross-border contacts, delivering the peace process on the ground as practical 
citizen-based as much as top-down elite projects. Co-operation in both public sector projects 
and business ventures intended to reinforce cross-border and inter-communal integration are 
the functional anchor of the peace process.28  Notable here are arrangements for improving 
transportation and communication links, a common regime for food safety, for coastal lights 
and navigation of internal waterways that traverse the Irish border, and cultural exchanges 
and civic engagement between formerly disconnected and ideologically estranged 
communities.  
Significant examples of trans-border functionality are the all-island energy market for the 
generation and supply of electricity, as well as mutual sanitary-phytosanitary arrangements 
for monitoring animal health on the island, the latter essential for agriculture and especially 
the dairy industry that is crucial for the local border economy.29 A raft of common regulatory 
arrangements exemplifies the classic functionalist paradigm of European integration, yet each 
of these regimens is likely to be curtailed or cease altogether post-Brexit. Divergence here 
will significantly dilute regulatory and standards approximation for traded products and 
service provision, including consumer protection and health and safety, with obvious and 
adverse consequences for cross-border trade and regulatory harmonization.  
Further negative externality from restoring a formal border will ensue from the 
discontinuance of trans-border public procurement contracts and joint bids for EU framework 
programmes and structural funds. Agencies on either side of the present border have grown 
used to pooling public resources, co-operating together to develop mutual programmes and 
                                                          
28 B. Laffan and D. Payne, The EU in the Domestic: Interreg III and the Good Friday Institutions, Irish Political Studies, 
17.1, 2002, pp. 74-96. 
29 See https://www.daera-ni.gov.uk/articles/cattle-imports-gbUK Withdrawal (‘Brexit’) and the Good Friday Agreement.  
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other common endeavors for improving efficiency and delivering economies of scale in 
service provision, notably in public health, social services and education. An unprecedented 
level of interdependence is now operational in Ireland, but again likely to be disrupted or 
discontinued altogether after Brexit. The work of the Special European Union Programmes 
Body (SEUPB) is a telling example here. The most important North-South agency for 
managing cross-border EU structural funds and responsible for implementing the EU 
Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland, with four substantive peace 
projects operationalised thus far. SEUPB financially bankrolls programmes and actions that 
actually deliver the peace process as practical projects, to date providing some 1.5 billion 
euros of funding. These programmes have contributed signally to reducing the formalities, 
indeed the very visibility of the border as an palpable presence in the lives of local 
communities on either side, by improving transportation and communication links, fostering 
those social and economic networks and civic exchanges that have markedly improved co-
operation between both communities and various agencies and governance on every side. The 
British Government’s rather lame assurance that trans-border initiatives and community 
programmes essential to the peace process will continue regardless, for instance by its 
guarantee of continued funding for the current EU Peace IV and INTERREG programme up 
to 2020 should Brexit happen earlier than that date, is hardly a convincing case for the 
maintenance of the status quo ante.  
 
 (4) Free movement of people: A Common Travel Area (CTA) exists between the United 
Kingdom and the Republic without any requirement for immigration controls. This 
arrangement is less a direct consequence of EU membership - it has been in existence since 
partition – although it does reinforce the EU’s free movement requirement. The CTA is a 
legacy, indeed an affirmation of close if ambivalent historical and cultural ties between the 
two states following their formal separation in 1921.30 Since the Republic’s constitutional 
break from the British State, Irish citizens have enjoyed special privileges in the United 
Kingdom, including the right to reside, to access certain social benefits, and even to exercise 
the franchise in British general elections.31 In strictly legal terms, Irish citizens are subject to 
British immigration law, but both countries have exercised a self-denying ordinance here, 
with border checks imposed only during wartime after the Republic opted for neutrality.32 
Although not deriving in any degree from EU membership these uncommon arrangements 
are entrenched as protocols appended to the EU treaties. Most especially Article 2 of Protocol 
No.20 of the Lisbon Treaty that confirms both countries, ‘‘may continue to make 
arrangements between themselves relating to the movement of persons between their 
territories’’.33 
Brexit is both a political and juridical challenge to these novel provisions and arrangements, 
as it is to other aspects of this singular post-imperial relationship. Freedom of movement 
between these neighbouring islands post-Brexit raises the important issue of how to 
                                                          
30 See the evidence from Professor Bernard Ryan to House of Lords European Union Committee , ‘Brexit: UK Irish 
relations’, House of Lords Paper 76 (2016), pp.32-33. 
31 The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union, UK Government, CM 9417, 2 February 
2017. 
32 See the evidence from Professor Bernard Ryan to House of Lords European Union Committee (2016) ‘Brexit: UK Irish 
relations’, House of Lords Paper 76, pp.32-33. 
33 Available online at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN, p.293. 
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distinguish between categories of citizens, whether Irish or British citizens and those of other 
EU countries. Neither country is signatory to the Schengen Agreement and both apply border 
controls to arrivals from elsewhere in the EU. The British Government’s ‘solution’ to this 
conundrum, as with so many other Brexit-related technicalities is simply affirmation, to 
proclaim its ‘determination’ to avoid a rigid system of passport controls at the Irish border, 
and likewise to maintain visa free access to the EU for its citizens and vice versa.  
This is hardly adequate response, in that the realities of ingress and egress across a reinstated 
and indeed a politically controversial border will present difficulties for citizens of the 
Republic, even if they do retain the privileges conferred by the Common Travel Area. More 
problematic is the incentive of a less restrictive border between the EU and United Kingdom 
domains than at the present British border at Calais and elsewhere for non-EU citizens’ intent 
on reaching the United Kingdom, by circumventing the customary requirements for visa, 
work permits or asylum status. Depending on the final withdrawal arrangements, former EU 
partners (notably France and Belgium) might have less inducement to police their own 
borders on behalf of the United Kingdom than they presently do. 
The British Government has somewhat disingenuously proposed what its representatives 
describe as light-touch ‘point of contact’ controls, whereby ordinary citizens will implement 
‘checks’ on the rights of non-British and non-Irish citizens to work, reside and access key 
services. A proposal that is fraught with political problems: on one side, certain to raise 
objections from Irish citizens in Northern Ireland being required to act as de facto border 
guards on behalf of the British State. On the other, resistance from the hard-Brexit lobby 
committed to tighter controls on British immigration. After all, this one issue was the main 
catalyst, the most successful recruiter for the Brexit vote, and one that is likely to rally 
domestic support behind calls for a much stronger border regime in Ireland in order to deter 
illegal entry into the United Kingdom by migrants via what is regarded as Britain’s most 
permeable external border.   
There is no agreement yet on an issue that is crucial for those who campaigned and voted for 
Brexit, and who see immigration controls are a paramount concern. To resolve this issue 
however will require more than merely lame assurance or bland words from politicians. A 
rigorous border regime to deter illicit entry to the United Kingdom via the geographically 
porous Irish border and to ensure an end to free movement of EU citizens into the British 
domain can only mean reinstating and policing a ‘hard’ border in Ireland, and for that matter 
elsewhere. That, or remaining at the very least within the Customs Union or something very 
much like it, an outcome that would contravene the Government’s pledge to the majority who 
voted for Brexit to ’take back control’, to recover national sovereignty sine die. This seeming 
inconsistency, or policy paradox as London prefers to see it, is the crux of the border 
conundrum. Critics of the British Government’s lackadaisical assertions about avoidance of a 
hard border in Ireland, whether in the ‘remain’ or ‘leave’ camps, point out a fundamental 
inconsistency in Government policy. On the one hand, ministers boldly claiming the return of 
national control at the border by ending free movement, and outright refusal to compromise 
sovereignty by remaining in the EU’s customs regime. Whereas those same ministers refuse 
to own up to the incontrovertible fact that to avoidance of the ‘hard’ border regime they claim 
as an achievable policy objective is only attainable by participating in some version of a 
customs union with Ireland and indeed the rest of EU27.  
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For this very reason, the dilemma facing the British Government is entirely discrepant: both 
to deliver an uncompromising and unequivocal Brexit, whilst concurrently avoiding what 
objective observers regard as the inescapable reality of making unpalatable compromises on 
its so-called ‘red lines’ for securing a trade deal with the EU.34  One can quite see why this 
difficult choice is even more complicated in the special circumstances that define the Irish 
border. Some thirty thousand people on both sides of the border live in one part of Ireland 
whilst working, trading or studying in the other. To say nothing of the challenges of 
managing cross border traffic flows which have risen exponentially since 1998. A ‘border’ 
that has become a complex weft of interdependencies: social, commercial and civic networks, 
all of them activities for which rigorous border checks will be severe impediment, imposing 
additional costs on business, placing further strain on official agencies mandated to 
implement them. Not the least of these challenges is the ratchetting of familiar political 
tensions in a region where historical memory is very much alive and still in play.35  
 
 (5) Assuring civil rights and equality:  Rights equivalence is the normative underpinning 
of the Belfast Agreement and the sine qua non of the peace process. The legal denominator of 
communal reconciliation and shared civic purposes, and for that very reason enshrined in EU 
law, providing assurance to citizens against unwonted discrimination regardless of their 
cultural origin or religious affiliation. The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the 
transnational legal order that is the safeguard of these rights is more likely than not to dilute 
the juridical defence of their rights for the citizens of Northern Ireland.36 Of particular 
concern about these arrangements post-Brexit, is how far rights guaranteed in the Belfast 
Agreement that derive from EU membership will be impaired or even curtailed.37 The 
Agreement affirms equivalence in the standard of rights protection both in the Republic and 
in Northern Ireland, indeed ‘rights’ are the principal gauge of ‘parity of esteem’ as between 
individual members of the unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland.  
Whether or how far British withdrawal from the EU’s supranational legal code might devalue 
or otherwise diminish these legal guarantees to citizens is a source of considerable anxiety, 
even as the United Kingdom remains, for the time being at least, adherent to the European 
Convention of Human Rights. If fundamental rights are elemental to the peace process, as 
they surely are, the question of trammelling such rights, or losing them altogether is a matter 
of concern for all citizens of the United Kingdom and not merely those in Northern Ireland. 
Although this is a matter of broader constitutional remit, and one that is properly a subject for 
separate and more informed review elsewhere.38 For the minority community in the North, 
long time victims of civil rights abuses that eventually gave rise to an insurgent politics, 
Brexit is an uncomfortable reminder of decades of official and informal discrimination and at 
                                                          
34 The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union, London: HM Government, HMSO, 
CM9417, available online at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/589191/The_United_Kingdoms_ex 
it_from_and_partnership_with_the_EU_Web.pdf. 
35 Brexit: UK-Irish relations, House of Lords European Union Committee ,House of Lords Paper 76, (2016) p.18.   
36 European Commission, Guiding principles for the Dialogue on Ireland/Northern Ireland, Brussels, 20 September 2017 
available online at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/guidingprinciples-dialogue-ireland-northern-ireland_en.  p. 
4. 
37 C. McCrudden, The Good Friday Agreement, Brexit and Rights (British Academy London and Royal Irish Academy 
Dublin 2017), at p.16.  
38 See Vernon Bogdanor, Brexit And Our Unprotected Constitution, The Constitution Society, 2018.  
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every level of society and politics. A fact acknowledged by the government in Dublin and the 
Brussels institutions alike, indeed by anyone concerned to ensure and protect fundamental 
rights as the normative ballast of liberal and democratic politics, and essential for sustaining 
the peace process.39 To remove the EU and most especially its legal order as a principal 
guarantor of the peace process while not in itself implying any downgrading of fundamental 
rights in Northern Ireland is entirely problematic for minorities there. And in light of the 
recent debate on legal impediment to a woman’s rights to abortion in the Province, not only 
for the nationalist minority.40 To exit the EU’s legal order will undoubtedly take a toll of the 
still fragile trust across the communal divide, by weakening the institutional pillars of a 
rights-based order in a polity, where prior to 1998 rights were frequently compromised or 
merely arbitrary.  
A related concern is the prospect (widely anticipated) of impending British withdrawal from 
the ECHR, and another barometer of the United Kingdom’s present ‘exceptionalism’ and 
increasing nativist mind-set. A late signatory to the Convention after the Blair Government 
incorporated it into British law it was never entirely acceptable to many in the Conservative 
Party who regard it as improper constraint on judicial autonomy and parliamentary 
sovereignty. Exiting the Convention remains a distinct possibility, although to do so would 
further weaken what is a fundamental juridical mainstay of the Belfast Agreement. A move 
too that will signify further attrition of the United Kingdom’s commitment to the 
transnational European legal order, and with that the demise of an important safeguard for 
minority rights in Northern Ireland. A risk widely acknowledged by EU authorities and 
institutions, although rather less so by some Westminster politicians’ intent on ‘taking back 
control’ of British laws. The familiar assertion by those who regard a sovereign Parliament as 
the surest, indeed from this sovereigntist standpoint the only rightful guarantor of 
fundamental rights, is hardly convincing, bearing in mind the acute observation of the 
eminent English jurist William Blackstone that what ‘Parliament’ has done any successive 
parliament may just as readily undo.41  
A final consideration here is the likely consequence of Brexit for the singular arrangement 
that is citizenship in Northern Ireland. The unique status that predates British and Irish EU 
accession is the right of anyone born on the island of Ireland to hold Irish citizenship without 
relinquishing British nationality. There is no reason why Brexit should alter this status, unless 
either government determines otherwise: the Irish government withdrawing the right to 
duality, or the British Government prohibiting it for its own citizens in Northern Ireland. As 
things currently stand, both are unlikely occurrences. Exercising the right to EU citizenship 
post-Brexit is however altogether more problematic for the Province’s denizens. National 
citizenship is the legal requirement for acquiring the status and rights of European 
                                                          
39 Guiding principles for the Dialogue on Ireland/Northern Ireland, Brussels, European Commission, 20 September 2017, at 
p. 4. 
40 Eloise Todd, For Northern Ireland Women, The Abortion Referendum and Brexit Negotiations have Huge 
Ramifications, Huffington Post 24 May 2018, available online at https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/irish-
referendum-
brexit_uk_5b0699f3e4b0784cd2b1e5ae?guccounter=1&guce_referrer_us=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmN
vLnVrLw&guce_referrer_cs=BqvHt3DG3uMdLY7d6z2uiA. 
41 Commentaries, Volume 1 (1765 edition), at pp. 160-162. 
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citizenship. Citizens in the Province who opt for singular British nationality will 
automatically lose those rights, unless they choose dual nationality.42  
This may be accounted no great loss, and for sovereigntists who see ‘Europe’ as entirely 
‘other’ and EU citizenship as essentially meaningless. Yet for some citizens, especially the 
young for whom multi-layered arrangements for political attachment and belonging confirm 
novel opportunities and arrangements for altogether more nuanced expressions of political 
and cultural identity this derogation is certainly problematic. The idea of multiple citizenships 
is an attractive option for those of a cosmopolitan outlook, a means of accessing the emergent 
and multi-faceted socio-cultural reality that is contemporary cultural attachment, what some 
scholars commend as ‘post-national identity’.43 Citizenship arrangements that confer a degree 
of individual choice about how to express identity, that permit altogether novel ways of 
manifesting ontological ideas about ‘self’ and for redefining political obligation to 
community and polity are counted by contemporary youth in particular as a demonstration of 
meaningful choice about how to express ‘selfhood’, identity and belonging . Choices that 
offer the prospect for transnational attachments and plural identities that some residents of 
Northern Ireland might prefer to embrace, but variable or layered identities that Brexit now 
threatens to foreclose.   
 
BREXIT AND UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES 
Brexit has called into question many shibboleths about British and European politics, not 
least assumptions about ineluctable progress towards a new politics in Ireland. In the process, 
it has revived anxieties, both there and further afield about likely inimical consequences of 
reinstating a physical border between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Of course, nothing 
in the sinuous world of politics is ever certain. The only infallible law of politics is that which 
predicts ‘unanticipated consequences’, and by definition the ‘unanticipated’ usually catches 
us completely unawares! And a truism that pertains as much to Brexit as to any other 
hominine design. Brexit has certainly called into question steady if tentative progress towards 
communal co-operation and cultural reconciliation in Ireland that is the consequence of the 
peace process, and accordingly reviving familiar anxieties about a hard border in Ireland. 
Paramilitary insurgents are still active in some border communities, emboldened by the 
Province’s increasingly dysfunctional politics and not least by the prospects of impending 
chaos at the border.  How far then are such anxieties merely exaggerated, and how might they 
be averted? 
Since 1998 the border has become invisible, more conduit than barrier between Ireland North 
and South and at every level. Cross-border trade has expanded exponentially and increasing 
civic engagement is both entrenching and normalizing the peace process on both sides.44 The 
border region is slowly but surely becoming as much a shared civic and political, as a merely 
functional or economic space. A process made easier by removing insignia and signage 
                                                          
42 Brian Ó Caoindealbháin, Citizenship and borders: Irish nationality law and Northern Ireland, IBIS working paper no. 68, 
Working Papers in British-Irish Studies No. 68, Institute for British-Irish Studies, University College Dublin 2006.  
43 G. Delanty, Habermas and post‐ national identity: Theoretical perspectives on the conflict in Northern Ireland, Irish 
Political Studies, 11 (1) 1996, pp.20-32. 
44 J. Goodman, Single Europe, Single Ireland? Uneven development in process. Dublin (Irish Academic Press, 2000). 
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denoting national allegiance or exclusive sovereignty.45 The prospect of a reinstated border 
threatens that endeavor, concentrating minds in both communities, in government and in 
Brussels about the malign consequences of what seems to most observers to be an entirely 
retrograde move.  
These baleful consequences were not remotely on the political radar until Brexit reset the 
dial, revived concerns about future relations between the two jurisdictions in Ireland.  A 
discourse on the United Kingdom’s constitutional design by no means confined to the affairs 
in Northern Ireland. The divorce of the United Kingdom from the EU will likely have 
important constitutional reverberations beyond Ireland, not least for the ongoing discourse on 
the constitutional status of the British State and its four constituent territories. A majority of 
voters in Scotland and Northern Ireland chose in the 2016 referendum to remain in the EU. 
The most politically contentious consequence of this decision is whether or how far the 
ramifications of the ‘remain’ vote in two of the United Kingdom’s constituent polities will 
impact on and potentially alter the future state of British politics. Possibly offering an 
incentive to those bent on further constitutional dislocation, potentially bringing closer the 
prospect of the disintegration of what only a few short decades ago was a stable centralized 
and unitary state.  
Brendan O’Leary amongst other commentators takes a rather more sanguine view of these 
potential and unintended consequences. As he sees it, the Belfast Agreement permits 
altogether more flexible constitutional arrangements between the constituent parts of the 
United Kingdom than presently exist, not least in the context of an increasingly devolved 
British polity. To that extent, Brexit might ratchet further demands from nationalist parties 
and other self-styled modernizers within the territorial polities for further devolution from the 
centre: demands that will likely resonate with some in marginalized electorates already 
receptive to ideas about a federal Britain, or even to outright independence. In the process, 
legitimating at least for many voters on the Celtic fringes claims for an unprecedented degree 
of constitutional autonomy that would permit Northern Ireland, and should voters there will it 
Scotland too, to demand a distinct and to a degree even a separate political status from the 
rest of the British State.46 A ‘claim of right’ as it were expressing popular sovereignty that 
Westminster politicians could hardly deny them after their own pursuit of autonomy and 
‘escape’ from putatively ‘remote’, ‘interfering’ and centralized governance located in 
Brussels. This constitutional aftershock should it come to pass would be the most dramatic of 
Brexit’s prospective ‘unanticipated outcomes. 
According to this imaginative if unorthodox interpretation of Britain’s constitutional future, 
Northern Ireland and Scotland might feasibly retain EU membership, even as they nominally 
remain within the devolved framework of the British State, or they might do so pending the 
outcome of further referenda in both countries. A border poll in Northern Ireland to 
determine the Province’s status vis à vis the United Kingdom, and a further referendum in 
Scotland to review relations with the rest of the United Kingdom, and prospectively even to 
endorse full independence. On this permissive reading of the United Kingdom’s present 
                                                          
45  A. Guelke, International dimensions of the Belfast Agreement, in R. Wilford (ed.) Aspects of the Belfast Agreement 
(Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 245-263.   
46 Brendan O’Leary, Detoxifying the UK’s exit from the EU, a multi-national compromise is possible, available online at 
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constitutional situation, enforced exit of both countries from the EU solely on the grounds of 
a majority pro-Brexit vote in England would be claimed by proponents as reasonable and 
principled, even if not strictly legal grounds on which to determine their own constitutional 
futures according to the established principle of devolution. An assumed right to remain in 
the United Kingdom, or to withdraw from the union state, and each separate territorial nation 
determining its own future relations with the EU is now at least on the agenda, an outcome 
never considered likely before Brexit. Whether any such claim to self-determination would 
have constitutional validity, let alone political credibility is quite another matter. 
Nevertheless, any claim along these lines would almost certainly propel the United Kingdom 
into full-blown political crisis, prompting rebellion by territorial nationalists in the smaller 
constituent nations who are already ideologically committed to the break-up of the British 
State.47 A far-fetched scenario maybe, but Brexit has brought all manner of uncertainty and 
unintended consequences to United Kingdom politics and governance, and not least to 
Ireland.   
The mood of apprehension in Ireland following Brexit in both principal communities and on 
either side of the border threatens to discontinue, or at least to abate local community projects 
that have successfully engaged formerly disconnected and even mutually hostile border 
communities. For that very reason, there it is existential risk to the peace process itself. When 
the Belfast Agreement was first concluded there was no question that both the United 
Kingdom and the Republic would remain as Member States of the European Union, and as 
such conjointly guarantors of the peace process. Brexit is now a clear and present challenge 
to these presumptions of continuity, whether for the peace process per se but more widely for 
Anglo-Irish and UK-EU relations in what will be an uncertain future. An uncertain situation 
is already feeding anxiety on the ground, not least about the closing of actual and 
metaphorical ‘doors’ opened in Belfast’s infamous ‘peace walls’ erected at the height of the 
Troubles in order to improve security by maintaining physical separation between what were 
then conflictual and even warring tribes. A recent report about the removal of these symbolic 
barriers to sectarian divisions ruefully observed: ‘‘The fact that so many (barriers) remain in 
place is evidence of the often glacial pace of progress. As the painstaking work continues, 
however, it is not lost on those labouring to bring down physical and sectarian barriers that 
the vote for Brexit has led to the threat of new ones being erected.’’48  
In these uncertain times, the likelihood is that the significantly altered status of the post-
Brexit border will have far-reaching and mostly negative consequences for future relations on 
the island of Ireland, and at every level. Brexit threatens a fundamental reversal of a tentative 
yet tangible peace process, a fundamental downshift in political, commercial and civic 
relations that means North-South co-operation cannot continue on present terms. Certainly 
not, if as seems likely, quite different economic and regulatory arrangements will pertain in 
the island’s respective political jurisdictions, a fact that will become even more conspicuous 
by a reinstated and formal border. The next paper in the series will review various and by no 
                                                          
47 Fintan O’Toole, United Ireland will not be based on ‘50 per cent plus one’. Brexit has made Irish unity more likely, but we 
need to reunify people first, The Irish Times, August 15 2017. 
48 Michael Savage, In Belfast fear is growing that the hated barriers will go up again. The row over Brexit and the border 
threatens to stop the slow removal of the peace walls that divide Protestant and Catholic, The Observer (London), 6 May 
2018, available online at https://www.theguardian.com/global/2018/may/06/no-one-wants-border-ireland-belfast-barriers-
stay-up. 
17 
 
means mutually consistent proposals for resolving the conundrum that is the post-Brexit Irish 
/ United Kingdom border. 
 
 
